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Do Political or Security Conditions Determine When American 
Security Transfers Are Made? 
Abstract 
When terrorist attacks became more frequent and destructive in the early portion of the 
twenty-first century, American officials asserted that Islamist networks needed to be 
crippled. After a campaign against these groups was launched, Washington began to rely 
on some new security measures. For the past two decades, several studies have been 
produced about innovations such as drone strikes. What has not been seen, though, are 
analyses of measures that the U.S. unveiled in the Cold War and has continued to use in the 
effort against Islamist organizations. Within this article, America;s continued reliance on 
transferal operations will be taken into consideration. While a military intervention is in 
progress, policymakers declare that U.S. troops will be withdrawn from a country once 
indigenous elements are capable of inheriting their responsibilities. However, a security 
transfer usually takes place when the intervention becomes unpopular on the American 
home front. 
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/
iss2/5 
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Introduction 
 
Since becoming the most powerful capitalist nation at the conclusion of 
the Second World War, the United States has conducted several military 
campaigns in developing nations. When policymakers in Washington have 
recognized that certain operations are not generating desirable results, 
they have implemented new strategies to salvage them. While inspecting 
various missions from the post-World War II era in a superficial fashion, it 
becomes apparent that the favored strategy of U.S. officials is the 
transferal policy or having indigenous elements in a particular nation 
assume the peacekeeping responsibilities of U.S. soldiers. Once 
policymakers embrace this policy, they must select the point at which an 
army or police force will inherit the tasks that U.S. troops are performing.  
The remarks of George W. Bush lead one to believe that the security 
conditions in the target country determine when the United States makes 
a transfer. During a speech about an operation in Iraq, he said, “As the 
Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.”1 
 
The closer an individual looks at prior initiatives, the more he or she is 
likely to realize that the political situation in the United States actually 
determines when an army or police force inherits the responsibilities of 
U.S. soldiers.  Thorough examinations of the U.S. interventions in Korea 
and Vietnam in the upcoming pages will enable the reader to see the 
manner in which U.S. presidents have a propensity to complete transfers 
when military interventions start to become unpopular on the home front. 
The operation on the Korean Peninsula in the 1950s will commence in the 
next section. 
 
U.S. Involvement in the Korean War   
 
In order to develop a solid understanding of the transfer in Korea, it is 
imperative to discuss some of the developments that preceded it. Within 
Proxy Wars, Eli Berman and David Lake note how a major power has two 
options for neutralizing an external threat. When the leaders of the 
country do not want to place troops in harm’s way or spend a considerable 
amount of money, they can rely upon indirect action. In other words, they 
can ask another state to take the necessary steps to eliminate the security 
threat. There is the possibility that an ally will not have soldiers that are 
capable of weakening an enemy for an extended period. If this deficiency is 
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present, the major power will need to resort to direct action by having its 
own soldiers cripple the foe.2 
 
At the end of the Second World War, the United States appeared to be a 
power that would just use direct action in the ideological struggle with the 
Soviet Union. In the middle of the 1940s, there were anti-communist 
actors in Japan and Germany that would have provided assistance in the 
fight against the USSR. However, policymakers in Washington decided to 
place combat troops within these nations in the midst of reconstruction. 
By the end of the 1940s, there were events that indicated the United States 
was amenable to having others take the lead in the battle against 
international communism. The most important event in relation to this 
discussion is the manner in which Harry Truman, the thirty-third U.S. 
president, had approximately five hundred troops assists the South Korean 
government with the development of its military.3  
 
Officials in Seoul and Washington had different perspectives about the 
future use of this military. In the aftermath of the Second World War, a 
communist regime came to power in North Korea. It did not take long for 
Moscow to start providing the North Koreans with tanks and other 
equipment to construct a formidable military. Because this military 
buildup was occurring above the thirty-eighth parallel (the boundary that 
separated the two Koreas), U.S. officials believed that the members of the 
incipient South Korean military would be used to thwart acts of 
aggression. Syngman Rhee, the leader of South Korea, did not envision 
using military personnel to repel North Korean attacks. Instead, he 
anticipated utilizing them to prevent his political rivals from removing him 
from office.4 
 
During the summer of 1950, Rhee’s political foes did not organize a coup 
d’état, but North Korea did launch a full-scale invasion. On June 25, 1950, 
North Korean soldiers began to move across the thirty-eighth parallel at 
various points. As they met members of the South Korean army, they did 
not encounter much resistance since South Korean soldiers fled from their 
assigned defensive positions. Just one week into the war, the hierarchy of 
the South Korean military could not account for 44,000 of the troops that 
had received training from the United States.5 Since the South Korean 
desertion rate was so high, North Korean forces took control of key 
locations such as Seoul without much difficulty.6   
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Inside A General’s Life: An Autobiography, Omar Bradley, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Truman, says that U.S. officials typically 
give the military commander in a theater of operations the autonomy to 
decide how acts of aggression should be handled.7 At the time of the North 
Korean invasion, Douglas MacArthur was the leader of U.S. forces in Asia. 
On June 29, 1950, MacArthur traveled to the Korean Peninsula to 
ascertain whether U.S. combat troops would have to fight against the 
North Koreans. Shortly after his arrival, MacArthur concluded that the 
United States needed to make the transition from indirect to direct action 
because he frequently saw South Korean soldiers that were both “defeated 
and dispersed.”8 He quickly sent a cable to Washington that requested the 
deployment of the U.S. 24th Division. In addition to granting this troop 
request, Truman named his subordinate the leader of all United Nations 
forces in Korea.9    
 
From the information at the end of the preceding paragraph, one can 
gather that the United Nations supported the military campaign on the 
Korean Peninsula. This international institution elected to back the 
operation, but the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate did not pass a 
resolution sanctioning military action in Asia, making the Korean conflict 
the first major U.S. war without Congressional authorization. Something 
else, which separates the Korean conflict from preceding wars, is its 
outcome. In the Mexican-American War, Spanish-American War, World 
War I, and World War II, U.S. forces managed to secure convincing 
triumphs against their adversaries. The U.S. troops in Korea, on the other 
hand, had to settle for a stalemate against their communist opponents. As 
early as the summer of 1950, there were signs that the United States would 
be unable to replicate the success it had experienced in prior conflicts. 
When troops from the 24th Division arrived in South Korea, they 
consistently lost to North Korean forces on the battlefield. This 
disappointing turn of events forced officials to accelerate the U.S. troop 
buildup below the thirty-eighth parallel.10  
 
Once the U.S. reinforcements arrived, there were indications that the 
North Koreans were beginning to lose their momentum. Although the 
North Koreans acquired several strategic positions in their initial advance, 
they were cognizant of the fact that more would need to be seized if they 
were going to be victorious, especially the Taegu-Masan-Pusan-Kyongju 
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rail connection that was allowing the UN to transport supplies and 
personnel throughout South Korea. For six weeks, the North Koreans 
attempted to gain control of this rail connection. However, they were 
unable to do so because the members of the U.S. Eighth Army thwarted all 
of their offensives.11 When the U.S. reinforcements were not preventing 
the North Koreans from taking territory, they were liberating South 
Korean cities and towns. While the Second World War was in progress, 
MacArthur saw his troops perform successful amphibious landings across 
the Pacific Ocean. At one point on his tour of the Korean Peninsula in late 
June, he concluded that it would be advantageous to conduct another 
amphibious landing in Inchon, a port city near Seoul. Truman and others 
in Washington did not share MacArthur’s enthusiasm for this plan, but 
they eventually told him he could execute it. On September 15, 1950, 
personnel from the U.S. Seventh Division and First Marine Division did 
not come under heavy fire from North Korean troops, so they managed to 
move inward at a rapid pace and retake Inchon without much difficulty.12 
 
Because MacArthur disregarded presidential directives on more than one 
occasion, Truman believed he was similar to George McClellan, the Union 
General who had trouble following Abraham Lincoln’s orders during the 
U.S. Civil War.13 What the thirty-third U.S. president failed to realize was 
that these famous generals had more in common than a propensity to be 
insubordinate. In the fall of 1862, the Army of Northern Virginia was 
experiencing a considerable amount of casualties in the Battle of Antietam. 
Aware of the serious position he was in, Robert E. Lee, the commander of 
the Army of Northern Virginia, instructed the remainder of his soldiers to 
return to their home state. If he told his forces to pursue these retreating 
troops, McClellan probably would have been able to eliminate the rest of 
the Army of Northern Virginia, but he refrained from ordering such a 
maneuver. As American soldiers liberated South Korean cities and towns 
in September 1950, North Korean officials instructed their troops to move 
above the thirty-eight parallel. Like McClellan, MacArthur did not instruct 
the soldiers under his command to pursue those who were in retreat, so 
over 90,000 North Korean soldiers managed to find refuge in their native 
country.14  
 
The preservation of the North Korean army made it more difficult for the 
United States to unify the Korean Peninsula under the rule of Syngman 
Rhee. However, it was not as impactful as another development that took 
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place later in 1950. On October 2, 1950, Chou En-Lai, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister, met with Kavalam Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, in 
Beijing. While this meeting was in progress, En-Lai informed Panikkar 
that the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by U.S. led forces would 
prompt his nation to enter the Korean conflict.15 This warning, coupled 
with intelligence reports of a Chinese troop buildup in Manchuria, a 
province on the border of North Korea, should have resulted in 
policymakers in Washington electing to keep soldiers out of North Korean 
territory, but they allowed MacArthur to send the Eighth Army and other 
U.S. units above the thirty-eighth parallel. During the initial stages of the 
campaign in North Korea, U.S. troops managed to seize some cities and 
towns, including the capital of Pyongyang. Once Chinese troops began to 
arrive in North Korea, though, they seldom had opportunities to take 
control of locations of strategic value. Instead, they spent the majority of 
their time fleeing from Pyongyang and other seized land since the Chinese 
attacks were so overwhelming. By the end of 1950, every portion of North 
Korea was back in communist hands and U.S. soldiers were below the 
thirty-eighth parallel once again. 
 
Over the years, analysts have focused on the differences that were present 
between capitalist and communist nations during the Cold War. 
Consequently, they have rarely acknowledged the manner in which these 
rivals also shared some important similarities. At the beginning of 1951, it 
would have been prudent for officials in Beijing to refrain from launching 
a full-scale offensive in a hostile nation. However, like U.S. policymakers 
in October 1950, they decided to have the soldiers under their command 
conduct an invasion. Just one month into the Chinese campaign in South 
Korea, there were indications that it was not going to generate a desirable 
outcome. On February 10, 1951, X Corps, a U.S. division commanded by 
Edward Almond, MacArthur’s protégé, pushed Chinese forces out of 
Wonju. During the following month, the Eighth Army was able to regain 
control of the South Korean capital.16    
 
In the second year of the conflict, there was a major change in the fighting 
on the Korean Peninsula. Following the North Korean invasion in June 
1950, the majority of the battles that took place were reminiscent of the 
ones, which transpired during the Second World War. That is, they 
involved troops making territorial gains through the utilization of 
conventional tactics. During the summer of 1951, the engagements started 
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to remind observers of the battles that occurred in the First World War. 
Soldiers were still fighting against each other in a conventional fashion, 
but they seldom seized control of strategic locations.17 This evolution 
helped convince the members of the Truman administration that they 
needed to abandon the goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula under Rhee 
and concentrate on protecting the territorial integrity of South Korea. 
 
Not only did the figures from the Truman administration adopt a new 
objective, they developed another strategy for dealing with the conflict in 
Asia. Since South Korean soldiers were humiliated in the first month of the 
war, Truman had U.S. combat troops lead the effort against the North 
Koreans. Although South Korean troops were still performing poorly on 
the battlefield in 1951, there were signs that Truman wanted to hand the 
responsibility of leading the military campaign to them. If inefficient 
soldiers from an allied country are going to inherit a military campaign at 
a future date, they will need to receive additional training from troops that 
have experienced success in previous engagements. Aware of this need for 
more training, Truman started to increase the number of U.S. advisors in 
South Korea in 1951. By the month of September, 1308 trainers were 
below the thirty-eighth parallel to work with the members of the South 
Korean military.18 
 
A U.S. president who turns to the transferal policy anticipates that the 
withdrawal of combat troops will eventually follow the addition of 
advisors. When a troop withdrawal does take place, it is inevitable that the 
commander-in-chief will claim that the soldiers are being removed 
because the army or police force in a particular country has improved 
considerably.  However, there is a chance that he is making the move 
because he believes it will be helpful to him or his political allies on the 
home front. In such a situation, how can a U.S. citizen ascertain whether 
security enhancements abroad or political conditions at home are 
precipitating the drawdown? If the members of an army or police force 
maintain or seize territory in several battles against an opponent before 
the withdrawal, it will be possible for the American to conclude that the 
security conditions have improved in the target state. On the other hand, if 
a president is dealing with a war-weary Congress, running for re-election, 
or attempting to get a member of his party into the White House and 
military triumphs are rare, it will be appropriate for the citizen to presume 
that political considerations are influencing the drawdown.  
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Under Truman, multiple U.S. divisions were withdrawn from South 
Korea.19 While looking at the performances of South Korean troops in the 
time leading up to these withdrawals, it becomes apparent that they did 
not experience impressive victories against their communist opponents. 
Since the South Koreans were still struggling on the battlefield, one must 
turn to the developments inside the United States to explain the 
withdrawals that took place during the Truman presidency. As U.S. 
citizens learned about the lack of progress on the Korean Peninsula, their 
support for the war effort began to decline. Not only did these individuals 
become disillusioned with the military conflict, they started to lose 
confidence in the politician who was leading it. By December 1951, Harry 
Truman’s approval rating had plummeted to 23 percent.20 With the 
majority of the electorate opposed to him, Truman did not have the desire 
to seek another term in office the following year, but he was determined to 
see his party maintain control of the executive branch. In fact, when he 
was talking about Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic nominee he 
encouraged to run, in front of one audience, he said, “I am going to take 
my coat off and do everything I can to help him win.”21There is a chance 
the preceding material will not be enough to convince some readers that 
Truman’s troop withdrawals in 1952 were politically motivated. However, 
as they read about the U.S. experience in Vietnam in the next section,  
these skeptics will probably begin to think that a sitting president is 
capable of behaving in such an unappealing fashion. 
 
U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War 
 
The initial portion of the U.S. intervention in South Vietnam was similar to 
the early part of the mission in Korea since it also entailed the use of 
indirect action. There are two important differences between these indirect 
interventions, though. In Korea, only 500 U.S. advisors traveled to the 
Korean Peninsula to assist South Korean soldiers. The indirect 
intervention in South Vietnam commenced with approximately the same 
amount of advisors. However, in 1961, the number of U.S. advisors helping 
the South Vietnamese military rose to 17,000.22 
 
The other major distinction between these campaigns is the manner in 
which the U.S. trainers in South Korea and South Vietnam had different 
goals for their trainees. At the beginning of the 1950s, U.S. officials 
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believed that North Korea could launch an invasion of South Korea at any 
time. Consequently, the advisors below the thirty-eighth parallel were 
determined to turn the South Korean military into a force that was capable 
of repelling an invasion. During the early 1960s, many in Washington 
feared that a communist takeover in South Vietnam was on the horizon. 
However, they did not think the North Vietnamese would attempt to 
spread communism in the same fashion as the North Koreans. In other 
words, they did not believe officials in Hanoi would have military 
personnel invade South Vietnam since the North Vietnamese were already 
providing guns, grenades, and other weaponry to the members of the 
National Liberation Front, an insurgent group that was seeking to 
overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem’s anti-communist regime. U.S. officials hoped 
that the thousands of U.S. advisors below the seventeenth parallel (the 
boundary separating North Vietnam and South Vietnam) would transform 
the South Vietnamese military into an entity with the ability to quell the 
communist insurgency. 
 
The actions of the general population determine the length of a political 
insurgency. If the majority of the people in a country continue to stand 
behind the government, the insurgency will only last for a brief period. If 
numerous citizens stop supporting those in power, though, the insurgency 
will probably not end until a new political order is established. At the 
beginning of the 1960s, the Diem regime started to lose a lot of support in 
the South Vietnamese countryside. Consequently, it became possible for 
the National Liberation Front to take control of several villages. The first 
inclination of some in a counterinsurgency campaign is to respond to a 
loss of territory as if they were soldiers in a conventional conflict. In other 
words, they immediately presume that it would be advantageous to try to 
regain the land by utilizing a considerable amount of coercion. However, 
as one analyst has noted, such a reaction “is almost always entirely 
counterproductive.”23 In order to regain seized villages and other 
population centers, soldiers must enhance the living standards of citizens 
by distributing supplies, repairing roads, and so forth. Diem responded to 
the National Liberation Front’s territorial gains in a sagacious fashion by 
having military personnel implement a series of measures to improve the 
conditions in South Vietnamese villages. 
 
The U.S. government financed some of Diem’s programs. The one, which 
received the most U.S. funds, was his Strategic Hamlet Program. After it 
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was unveiled in 1962, many peasants moved to villages that were not as 
vulnerable to National Liberation Front penetration. Besides receiving 
more protection, the peasants got a substantial amount of economic aid. 
Although the Diem regime took these steps, the National Liberation Front 
kept seizing villages in the countryside. This increase in strength prompted 
multiple journalists in the fall of 1963 to conclude that Hanoi’s proxy was 
on the verge of winning the war.24    
 
U.S. officials possessed a more optimistic outlook about the conflict in 
Southeast Asia towards the end of 1963. Prior to the introduction of the 
Strategic Hamlet Program and other reforms, policymakers agreed with 
the Diem regime about what it would take to defeat the communist 
insurgency. In other words, they also believed that the best way to weaken 
the National Liberation Front was by improving the living standards of the 
South Vietnamese people. When this approach failed to bear any fruit, 
U.S. leaders reached the conclusion that progress would only emerge on 
this front in the struggle against communism if a new leader came to 
power in Saigon. One can notice this evolution in U.S. thinking while 
looking at some remarks from the individual who was serving as president 
at the time. During a television interview, John F. Kennedy said South 
Vietnam was in need of “changes in policy and perhaps…personnel.”25 
Fortunately, for Kennedy and his advisors, there were figures in the South 
Vietnamese military that were in the process of plotting Diem’s downfall. 
On November 2, 1963, the followers of Tran Van Don, the acting Chief of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, successfully removed Diem from power. After 
these rogue members of the military conducted the coup, the situation in 
South Vietnam did not get any better. Under Diem, analysts only found 
signs of deterioration outside of the government. In the post Diem era, 
unwanted developments such as villages falling into the hands of the 
National Liberation Front did continue, but there were also alarming 
events within the corridors of power in Saigon, including five other 
coups.26 
 
Unprecedented developments also transpired in the U.S. government 
following Diem’s ouster. While Diem was in office, U.S. policymakers 
always focused on developing strategies that could enable the South 
Vietnamese military to defeat the National Liberation Front. Once he was 
gone, they began to claim that a favorable outcome would only emerge if 
U.S. combat troops assumed control of the counterinsurgency effort from 
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the South Vietnamese. In the summer of 1965, Lyndon Johnson, John F. 
Kennedy’s successor, made the move from indirect to direct action by 
sending 100,000 combat troops to South Vietnam. When the United 
States resorted to direct action in Korea fifteen years earlier, it received the 
support of the United Nations, but this international institution refused to 
sanction the mission in Vietnam. Although the United Nations did not 
support the campaign in Vietnam, it was backed by the body that refrained 
from authorizing the operation in Korea. Before the combat troops arrived 
in South Vietnam, both chambers in the U.S. Congress passed a resolution 
that encouraged Johnson to “take all measures…to repulse aggression and 
prevent further aggression.”27 
 
The U.S. troops in South Vietnam encountered a war that was becoming 
even more complicated. For years, North Vietnamese involvement in the 
conflict below the seventeenth parallel was limited to providing military 
assistance to the National Liberation Front. In 1964, though, officials in 
Hanoi began to send combat troops to South Vietnam. By 1966, there were 
approximately 50,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam.28 
When Johnson made the decision to send combat troops to South 
Vietnam, he presumed that they would just need to concentrate on 
quelling the insurgency. However, once he learned about the size of the 
North Vietnamese troop buildup, he became cognizant of the manner in 
which these soldiers would also have to participate in conventional battles 
on occasion. 
 
The U.S. soldiers consistently experienced success as they carried out their 
unexpected responsibility. When North Vietnamese troops launched 
offensives to take control of government buildings or military bases, U.S. 
forces usually managed to keep them from seizing their targets. Although 
the Americans performed well in engagements against this conventional 
foe, they failed to develop an effective strategy for dealing with the 
unconventional one. In other words, they were unable to find an approach 
for weakening the National Liberation Front. Of all the introduced 
strategies, the one, which received the most use, was the search and 
destroy mission. While a search and destroy mission was in progress, 
soldiers were just supposed to eliminate National Liberation Front 
operatives hiding in a village. However, there were times when they also 
killed innocent civilians who were mistaken for National Liberation Front 
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members. After individuals saw friends or relatives die in one of these 
raids, they typically went on to join the National Liberation Front.29 
 
The rise in National Liberation Front recruits and other negative 
developments in the late 1960s forced William Westmoreland, the general 
overseeing the U.S. military effort in Vietnam, to ask Johnson for 200,000 
more combat troops. When Westmoreland had made troop requests in the 
past, Johnson had always provided him with the amount of men he 
wanted. However, on this occasion, the thirty-sixth U.S. president 
refrained from sending additional soldiers to Southeast Asia. In order to 
understand this unprecedented turn of events, one must take certain 
developments inside the United States into consideration. At the start of 
the U.S. escalation in the middle of the 1960s, eighty-five percent of the 
U.S. citizenry was in favor of becoming more involved in the Vietnamese 
conflict.30 By the latter portion of the decade, though, most Americans 
wanted to see military personnel withdrawn from South Vietnam. Since 
the war had become so unpopular, Johnson knew that news of a major 
troop increase would upset citizens on the home front. He also recognized 
he was in the same position that Harry Truman had been in at the 
beginning of the 1950s. That is, he realized that if he ran for another term 
in 1968 he would be defeated in a convincing fashion by his opponent. 
Once Johnson announced that he would not run, he tried to help Hubert 
Humphrey, his vice president, win the election. This provides another 
connection between Johnson and Truman, but they attempted to help 
their preferred candidates in different ways. In 1952, Truman decided to 
pull some troops out of South Korea. Sixteen years later, Johnson opted to 
halt the bombing campaign over North Vietnam shortly before U.S. voters 
went to the polls.31 
 
Although Humphrey received this assistance from Johnson, he still lost to 
Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate. After Nixon assumed control of 
the executive branch in January 1969, there were signs that he was 
another proponent of the transferal policy. In multiple addresses, the new 
commander-in-chief asserted that he planned to have South Vietnamese 
soldiers take over the military campaign.32 As the South Vietnamese 
became more proficient, it would be possible for him to withdraw U.S. 
soldiers from Southeast Asia. What deserves attention at this point is the 
manner in which Nixon was putting South Vietnamese soldiers in a far 
more difficult position than the South Koreans were in when Truman 
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turned to the transferal policy at the end of his presidency. South Korean 
soldiers, as mentioned in the preceding section, just had to concentrate on 
weakening a conventional enemy as U.S. troops departed. South 
Vietnamese personnel, in contrast, would have to deal with both 
conventional and unconventional foes.    
 
There was an indication in the summer of 1969 that Nixon had begun to 
implement his policy for the war. During the month of August, the new 
president removed 25,000 American troops from South Vietnam.33 One 
must remember that a troop withdrawal can only be attributed to better 
security conditions if the reduction is preceded by indigenous forces 
performing well on the battlefield. Prior to the withdrawal in August, the 
members of the South Vietnamese military did not show much 
improvement in battles against the North Vietnamese and the National 
Liberation Front. In the middle of May, they became involved in a 
memorable engagement with the former. At the beginning of the month, 
the North Vietnamese were in control of Apbia Mountain. This mountain 
near the Laotian border did not have any strategic value, but Creighton 
Abrams, the new U.S. commander in Southeast Asia, still wanted to seize it 
from the North Vietnamese. On May 10, 1969, he had U.S. and South 
Vietnamese forces launch an assault against the North Vietnamese on 
Apbia. Ten days into the campaign, troops from South Vietnam’s 2nd 
Battalion, 3rd Regiment, and 1st Division retreated when the North 
Vietnamese met their attempt to reach the top of Apbia with fierce 
resistance.34 Shortly after this disappointing turn of events, the members 
of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division managed to make it to the top of Apbia 
with another offensive that forced North Vietnamese soldiers to abandon 
their defensive positions.35 
 
Because the South Vietnamese military did not become more proficient in 
the time leading up to the August withdrawal, one must turn to the U.S. 
home front to explain Nixon’s decision. Truman, as mentioned in the 
discussion about the Korean War, believed troop withdrawals could help a 
member of his party win the presidential election of 1952. When Nixon 
came into the Oval Office in 1969, his long-term objective was not to make 
it easier for another Republican to win the 1972 presidential race. Instead, 
it was to ensure that he would not be a one-term president. As one 
historian has noted, Nixon knew that if he did not decrease the amount of 
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U.S. troops involved in the unpopular Vietnam conflict he would have “as 
little prospect of being reelected as LBJ had in 1968.”36     
 
For the rest of Nixon’s first term, other troop withdrawals took place in the 
aftermath of disappointing performances by South Vietnamese troops. 
However, if one inspects the subsequent years of Nixon’s only full term in 
office, one comes across notable differences between the drawdowns in 
1969 and the ones between 1970 and 1972. During the prior discussion 
about the Battle for Mount Apbia, it was mentioned how South 
Vietnamese soldiers fought alongside U.S. combat troops. From 1970 to 
1972, members of the South Vietnamese military often participated in 
engagements without this form of U.S. assistance. Ever since the start of 
the conflict, Hanoi had used a road through Cambodia and Laos to deliver 
supplies below the seventeenth parallel. In February 1971, South 
Vietnamese soldiers invaded Laos to eliminate the northern portion of the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail. At the beginning of the offensive or Lam Son 719 as it 
was called in Saigon, the South Vietnamese managed to seize control of 
some towns inside Laotian territory, but they were eventually forced out of 
these locations by members of the North Vietnamese military.37 In 
addition to losing these pieces of land, the South Vietnamese military lost 
a considerable amount of men. By the end of the forty-two day campaign, 
the South Vietnamese only had half of their forces left.38  
 
When the pilots of U.S. surveillance planes flew missions over Laos 
following the offensive, they recognized that “truck-traffic on the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail” had been “restored to its pre Lam Son 719 density.”39 Since the 
South Vietnamese were unable to accomplish their main objective, Nixon 
should have refrained from withdrawing more combat troops from 
Southeast Asia in 1971, but he elected to do so. In fact, by the end of the 
year, there was only one active American combat division left in South 
Vietnam.40  To see how Nixon’s desire to be re-elected was still affecting 
the decision-making in the White House during the latter stages of his first 
term, it is necessary to take some comments just one month after the 
conclusion of Lam Son 719 into consideration.  At that time, his National 
Security Adviser told him: “If we can, in October of ’72, go around the 
country saying we ended the war and the Democrats wanted to turn it over 
to the Communists…. Then we’re in great shape.”41 Something that sets 
this policy-making apart from what was taking place in 1969 is the manner 
in which the members of the Nixon foreign policy team now had to mollify 
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legislators who were making it difficult to prosecute the war in an 
aggressive fashion. Prior to the failed invasion in 1971, members of the 
House of Representatives and Senate passed a measure that prohibited 
U.S. combat troops from operating inside Laos and Cambodia.42 Following 
it, they approved another act that prevented personnel from participating 
in missions throughout all of Indochina.43 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the most important tasks that presidents assume once they adopt 
the transferal policy is determining when U.S. soldiers should be 
withdrawn from different countries. In speeches and interviews, multiple 
presidents have led U.S. citizens to believe that the capabilities of fledgling 
security forces determine when reductions transpire. However, the 
information in the preceding sections of this article indicates that the 
political landscape in the United States prompts chief executives to order 
drawdowns. While all presidents are concerned about what is happening 
on the home front, it is important to keep in mind that they do not always 
have the same political goals. Harry Truman reduced the number of troops 
on the Korean Peninsula because he wanted to help another member of 
the Democratic Party win the Presidential Election of 1952. Approximately 
seventeen years after these drawdowns in Korea, Richard Nixon started to 
withdraw soldiers from South Vietnam, but he took this step because he 
wanted to be re-elected and placate members of the legislative branch. 
 
The removal of troops gives presidents the opportunity to develop a more 
favorable political landscape inside the United States. What one must 
remember, though, is the manner in which drawdowns are likely to have 
an adverse impact on the security conditions in a developing country. As 
the members of a nascent army face an invading force or a contingent of 
insurgents, they may lose more battles or even go so far as to surrender to 
their enemies as many Iraqi soldiers did in the fighting against the Islamic 
State in 2014. A U.S. president obviously does not want to see these 
developments transpire abroad, so he should rely upon a policy that gives 
him a better chance of killing two birds with one stone. In other words, he 
should depend on a strategy that has the potential to allow him to deal 
with political problems on the home front and maintain order in a target 
nation. One option is to change the party that assumes the security 
responsibilities of American soldiers. The Korean and Vietnam cases 
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demonstrated that an American intervention could happen with or 
without support from the United Nations. When this international body 
sanctions a U.S. military mission, other countries usually deploy soldiers 
to the nation where it is taking place. If future presidents only participate 
in UN backed missions, there will be chances for them to use aid and other 
incentives to convince another intervening country to have its experienced 
soldiers assume the tasks of U.S. troops until indigenous elements are 
more capable.   
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